INTRODUCTION
[O]ur aim in founding the State was not the disproportionate happiness of any one class, but the greatest happiness of the whole; we thought that in a State which is ordered with a view to the good of the whole we should be most likely to find justice . . . . 1 -Plato
The vast majority of judicial selection discussions, whether in academia, on the bench, or in the bar, portray an unintended erudition. Although dressed down in the sartorial language of pragmatics, judicial selection debates are, albeit unintentionally, actually abstract philosophical discussions of competing Platonic Forms. The debates exist in an ethereal realm entirely separate from the earthly grime of the manner in which judges are actually selected. 2 This Article asserts that, while the Forms debate has its place, its high temperatures, infinite circularity, and chasm of separation from the actual day-to-day grind of administering justice for the rule of law's true consumers, renders the debate a luxury that, as a citizenry, we should no longer blindly indulge. Instead of asking "which method of judicial selection is 'best,'" we should ask "how can we improve our current judicial selection systems, whatever they may be?" 3 Professor Charles Geyh characterizes the judicial selection debate as an "endless" attempt to reconcile the "perennial struggle to strike an optimal balance between judicial independence and judicial accountability." 4 Nevertheless, "accountability and independence are
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[Vol. 67:219 two sides of the same coin: accountability ensures that judges perform their constitutional role, and judicial independence protects judges from pressures that would pull them out of that role." 5 Professor Geyh subscribes to the theory that, when determining which method of selection to advocate for, we may have a difficult time distinguishing our views between the relative merits of a method of selection and our views as to how a particular case should be decided. 6 He further contends that an individual's outcome determinative perspective may be prematurely tipping the scale in favor of elections or appointments, without weighing the pros and cons of either method. 7 The heuristic shortcomings to which he points further convolute an already deeply entrenched debate that is "in its third century, with no end in sight." 8 Professor Geyh equates the debate to a tennis match that appears to be plagued with perpetual lead changes where neither appointments nor elections are able to serve the final ace to win. 9 The endless nature of this debate makes "additional categorical indictments" 10 not only unproductive, but counterproductive. It is axiomatic that both elective systems and appointive systems are defective, and states are sticking to their respective status quos. The last state to shift its selection system for supreme court justices was New Mexico in 1988, almost three decades ago. 11 As recently as 2010, Nevada voters rejected a constitutional amendment that called for merit selection, as did South Dakota and Florida in 2004 and 2000 respectively. 12 With [T] he perennial policy struggle is to strike an optimal balance between judicial independence and accountability, to ensure that judges are independent enough to follow the facts and law without fear or favor, but not so independent as to regard the facts or law to the detriment of the rule of law and public confidence in the courts. structural shifts away from elective or appointive systems unlikely, 13 incremental reforms should be emphasized, at the expense of deemphasizing the selection debate.
The purpose of this Article is simple: to encourage the de-emphasis of the Forms version of the judicial selection debate in favor of a heightened focus on incremental improvements that actually redound to the benefit of litigants and the citizenry. Scholarly energies ought to be refocused from lofty Forms questions to the less lofty, but no less difficult, questions of incremental improvements. This is not to say that the Forms debate does not matter. After all, " [w] e should care about how America picks its judges because we should care about who becomes judges because we should care about the decisions that judges make." 14 We should care because judges interpret constitutions and statutes; because judges create law; and because judges "are powerful people who control the fates of parties who petition the courts to resolve their disputes." 15 The Forms debate, perhaps because of its endlessness, offers substantial guidance as to the strengths and weaknesses of various modes of selection. But at a certain point, we must stop merely repackaging old arguments as new, and must devote energy, through academic work or advocacy, towards improving the systems that real people come in contact with every single day.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I offers a brief survey of American judicial selection. 16 This Part notes, in particular, that most judicial selection modification efforts ultimately generate very little practical traction. 17 Occasionally, change occurs; the most recent trend centers on merit-based appointment processes, often referred to, especially by its proponents, as "merit selection." 18 Part II surveys recent trends in judicial elections, paying particular attention to the 13. JOHN F. KOWAL, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, JUDICIAL SELECTION FOR THE 21ST CEN-TURY 3 (2016), http://www.brennancenter.org/publication/judicial-selection-21st-century. Further, Professor Roy Schotland notes that the advocacy for contested elections is going nowhere: "People who advocate ending contestable elections always point to some pending bill in some state . . . but for over one hundred years, the hurdles in turning proposals into constitutional amendments have been all but insuperable." Roy A. Schotland 14. Geyh, supra note 6, at 14. influx of campaign spending, which has transformed the previously bleak and lifeless, into the hotly contested. 19 Since the fundamental argument in favor of elections is accountability, 20 Part III notes that the principal argument in favor of appointments is inversely, independence and the countermajoritarian role. 21 Finally, Part IV asserts that the imperfections of both judicial elections and appointments, and the relative stasis of methodology in the states, favors an agnostic approach to the Forms discussion as a means towards invigorating dialogue regarding more achievable, incremental measures. 22
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF JUDICIAL SELECTION
In their seminal work, Charles Sheldon and Linda Maule note that early American judicial selection methods were, in part, reactions to the "schizophrenic" experience 23 that colonists had with the English monarchs and the common law system. 24 Americans were accustomed to the attributes of the English common law system, but perceived colonial governors as corrupt. 25 These governors "ignored judicial rulings and . . . created courts in order to appoint their friends and supporters, regardless of their qualifications." 26 Consequently, the colonists pursued independence on two fronts: they sought not only independence from England, but judicial independence as well by establishing at least a modicum of separation of the judiciary from the executive. 27 The Articles of Confederation provided each state an appointed judiciary that was insulated from executive control. 28 The primary methods of appointment used in the fledgling states were gubernato- Id. at 2 ("Thus the schizophrenia over the proper role of judges resulted from a belief in the English system of law and courts but a rejection of how the system had actually operated in the colonies."); see also KOWAL, supra note 13, at 4-5 (noting colonial judges were both appointed and removable by the Crown, thus those who were not appointed because of the relation to the governor were still easily controllable because of the threat of removal).
27. See Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Economic Crisis and the Rise of Judicial Elections and Judicial Review, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1061, 1073 (2010) ("In the years leading up to the Revolution, the independence of the judiciary from the Crown was a key issue in a majority of the colonies, and this debate focused on offices held during good behavior.").
28 rial appointment with legislative confirmation, 29 and legislative appointment. 30 Judges in eight states were appointed by the legislature, 31 and judges in the remaining five states 32 were appointed by one of two forms of gubernatorial appointment with legislative confirmation. 33 The Framers emphasized judicial independence "by placing limits on political retribution by the executive and legislative branches." 34 The federal model adopted was akin to the gubernatorial selection system in which the executive nominated judges, subject to the advice and consent of the senate. 35 Once installed, federal judges enjoyed further independence from both the executive and legislative branches via life tenure and salaries protected from diminishment. 36 Gubernatorial and legislative appointments marked state judicial selection for several decades 37 with states entering the Union between 1776 and 1830 all adopting the selection methods that the original thirteen states enjoyed. 38 In the 1830s, populist calls for judicial accountability spurred a third method of judicial selection: partisan elections. 39 Populists were skeptical of insular insiders and asserted that judges were too dependent on the governors and legislators who appointed them, often for patronage purposes. 40 Accordingly, populists concluded that "elected judges who derived their authority from the people would be more independent-minded than handpicked friends of governors, or jurists 45 and the fear that courts were usurping the law-making powers of the legislature. 46 In 1832, Mississippi became the first state to elect its supreme court judges; however, no other state followed suit until New York's Constitutional Convention of 1846. 47 The Empire State opened the elective floodgates and from 1846 to 1853, twenty states adopted judicial elections. 48 By 1860, twenty-three out of thirty-one states in the Union elected some or all of their judges. 49 At the end of the nineteenth century, partisan judicial races were, at least by the standards of the time, perceived to be "hotly [contested] and intensely partisan . . . with special interests taking an active role in party nominations." 50 Dissatisfaction with the partisan election system was on the rise. 51 In his famous address to the American Bar Association, Roscoe Pound attributed the dissatisfaction to politicization of judicial elections that resulted from the partisan election system. 52 In his speech, he stated, "[P]utting courts into politics, and compelling judges to become politicians . . . has almost destroyed the traditional respect for the Bench." 53 For example, "to get on the ballot, judicial candidates often had to curry favor with party bosses who 41 [S]upporters of judicial elections understood the principal-agent problem, the gap between the people and their elected officials. They believed the solution was (1) to separate judges from the legislatures and governors that they wanted judges to check; (2) to embolden judges and legitimize judicial review by connecting them directly to "the people"; and (3) to allow "the people" to elect judges who would defend their constitutional rights. The push for reform gained momentum at the dawn of the twentieth century. 57 The stated goals were to "rationalize judicial administration" and to "remove partisan politics from the selection of judges." 58 In 1912, Ohio introduced nonpartisan judicial elections for state judges. 59 The innovation, if it can be characterized as such, simply meant that judicial candidates appeared on ballots without party affiliation. 60 The movement spread quickly, and by 1930, twelve states chose their appellate judges using nonpartisan judicial elections. 61 However, "from the outset, critics of the movement saw nonpartisan elections as an insufficient cure for the problems plaguing judicial elections." 62 Although direct influence of political parties was minimized, and voters were still able to choose their judges, glaring problems were evident. 63 For example, "roll-off" increased with the implementation of nonpartisan judicial elections, which was, in part, due to the lack of information available to voters about the judges they were electing. 64 Critics feared that special interests would determine close races and that unqualified judges-who would otherwise fail to attract electoral support-would garner a judgeship through "vigorous and deceptive campaigning." 65 The next phase in the seriatim efforts in opposition to judicial elections brought about the generously self-labeled merit selection plan. 66 In a merit selection system, judges are appointed by the governor from a pool of candidates whose qualifications have been reviewed and approved by an independent commission. 67 ceed to run unopposed in periodic retention elections, in which, until recently, voters almost invariably reselected the judges for another term. 68 In 1940, Missouri became the first state to adopt a meritbased appointment plan, 69 and such systems are frequently referred to as "Missouri Plans." 70 Proponents of merit-based appointment assert that it combines the better parts of other selection systems, with an emphasis on separating politics from the bench. 71 Currently, at least twenty-four states use merit-based appointment systems to select some or all of their judges. 72 However, despite the early and rapid growth, the last state to implement a merit-based appointment system was Rhode Island in 1994, following a series of scandals involving appointed supreme court justices. 73 Indeed, in the last three decades there has been a counter-movement against merit selection; voters have rejected merit selection ballot measures in six states. 74 In other states, merit selection proposals have failed to pass the legislative approval stage, so the proposals never reached the voters. 75 
III. ELECTIONS

A. Trends in Judicial Elections
Contemporary lay observers of judicial elections would scarcely recognize the predecessor contests of prior generations that have been colorfully characterized as being as "exciting as a game of checkers . . . played by mail." 76 For more than a century the contests were, perhaps blissfully, lacking in flourish. 77 95% respectively. 90 Consequently, the easy path to reelection that incumbents historically enjoyed proved more challenging. The loss rate of incumbents in nonpartisan elections nearly doubled between 1980 and 2000 from 4.3% to 8%, and the loss rate in partisan elections from the same period jumped from 26.3% to 45.5%. 91 These trends were also accompanied by surges in campaign spending by both candidates and interest groups. 92 Campaign fundraising more than doubled over the course of two decades. 93 From 1990-1999 to 2000-2009, fundraising rose from $83.3 million to $206.9 million. 94 Also, during 2000-2009, an overwhelming majority of states with contestable supreme court elections (twenty of twenty-two), experienced their most expensive contests ever. 95 With the increase in the temperature of judicial campaigns, there was a corresponding increase in litigation involving judicial elections. In 2002, the Supreme Court in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, ruled on the First Amendment rights of judicial candidates. 96 The Court held in a 5-4 decision that Minnesota's announce clause, forbidding candidates from announcing their views on disputed legal and political issues, was unconstitutional. 97 In 2009, the Court made another major decision affecting judicial elections, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal. 98 Grounding its decision in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court held that a judge is required to recuse himself not only when actual bias has been demonstrated or when the judge has an economic interest in the outcome of the case, but also where "extreme facts" create a "probability of actual bias." 99 campaigns, provided the restriction on speech was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest. 100
B. In Praise of Judicial Elections
Support for judicial elections stems from notions of "popular sovereignty and collective self-determination." 101 Elective proponents argue that, as judges play a critical role in the democratic system, they should be chosen by those who must submit to their authority. 102 They argue, much like those early critics of the clubby nature of appointments, that because judges are responsible for applying and interpreting rules of human behavior, judicial selection ought to entail heightened sensitivity and responsiveness to the "political, economic, social, moral, and ethical views held by a majority of citizens." 103 However, illustrative evidence for elective judge's closeness to the people is, at best, flimsy and conclusory. Claims of candidates' meaningful interactions with their constituents include examples of candidates riding with law enforcement officers, making rounds with social workers and doctors, and visiting schools and factories. 104 Wisconsin Justice, and previously its Chief Justice, Shirley Abrahamson describes judicial elections as an "educational experience for both the judges and the electorate." 105 Justice Abrahamson, like many ardent supporters of elections, believes that the requisite degree of accountability needed in the judiciary is achieved only when the judiciary is selected by the people. 106 Regardless of the selection method by which a judge comes to power, she cannot entirely set aside personal beliefs and values when applying legal principles to a particular set of facts. 107 As such, elective proponents see elections as a means through which judges can be held accountable for decisions that "offend a substantial portion of the citizenry. ; see also Geyh, supra note 3, at 336-37 (noting that judicial elections increase public awareness and involvement in the justice system because a more competitive race attracts more money which creates more advertising, piques voter interest and ultimately decreasing voter rolloff in the polls).
106. See Abrahamson, supra note 104, at 973; see also Dubois, supra note 103, at 34. 107. Dubois, supra note 103, at 38. 108. Id.; see also Geyh, supra note 3, at 333 (pointing out that judicial elections work as they were intended because social scientists have revealed that when faced with an upcoming elec-[Vol. 67:219
C. Efforts to Move Away From Judicial Elections
Despite withering critiques and near relentless pressure on the part of appointment proponents, judicial elections have proven to be remarkably enduring. Despite New York's adoption of an elective system in 1846, 109 the transition to judicial elections was not effortless. In 1867, one convention after instituting elections, there was still great debate over whether to retain the electoral system or return to appointments. 110 In fact, the delegate vote was so close, and the decision so difficult, that the ultimate decision was submitted to the people. 111 Consequently, the general elections of 1873 asked the people to decide the fate of their judicial selection system, and the voters, by a slim margin, responded in favor of elections. 112 In 1906, judicial elections received another blow when they were addressed in a famous speech by Roscoe Pound, which was aimed at the dissatisfaction with the administration of justice. 113 Judicial elections persisted, although another appeal came from President Taft in 1913 to do away with judicial elections. 114 Yet, while he called elections "disgraceful exhibitions of men," 115 Taft was well aware of the uphill battle he was fighting, and believed his appeal may be "hopeless." 116 Perhaps, at least on this score, Taft's judgment was impeccable. Thirty-nine states still elect trial or appellate judges, twenty-two states choose supreme court judges by non-partisan or partisan election, judges rule differently and consider the policy preferences of his electorate in higher esteem that his own personal "idiosyncratic ideological biases"). 116. Id. at 435 ("In the present attitude of many of the electorate toward the courts it is perhaps hopeless to expect the states, in which judges are elected for short terms, to return to the appointment of judges for life. But it is not in vain to urge its advantages.").
tion, sixteen states employ merit selection, and twelve states appoint supreme court justices. 117 Across the country, numerous state and national efforts, varying widely in their levels of resources and direction, have a singular focus: to advocate for abandoning judicial elections. To put it bluntly, hamsters on the wheel have made more progress. The Illinois State Bar Association advocated for nearly two decades to place merit selection on a statewide ballot-they accomplished this goal in 1970. 118 Although a majority of voters in isolated counties voted against judicial elections, elections still triumphed statewide by 146,000 votes. 119 This result seemingly halted the merit selection movement. 120 In Louisiana, there has been at least one proposed constitutional amendment calling for merit selection in all but one legislative session since 1978. 121 Every proposal has proven to be unsuccessful. 122 In North Carolina, the general assembly has considered bills to alter its method of judicial selection in nearly every legislative session since 1971. 123 Most of these bills call for merit selection, and despite prominent and vocal support from judges, governors, various organizations, and the senate, they ultimately fail on the house floor. In Ohio, a 1987 ballot initiative was introduced to adopt merit selection for appellate judges. 124 The initiative lost in eighty of Ohio's eighty-eight counties. In 2010, multiple bills were introduced in Minnesota that would have replaced judicial elections, and while the proposals advanced in senate committees, they were stalled in committee in the house. 125 In Nevada, proposed constitutional amendments replacing judicial elections were placed before the voters in 1972, 1988, 1995 extensive time to the anti-elections effort. 128 In 1992, the Florida Senate approved a bill calling for merit selection, but the House did not act. In 2000, a proposal was submitted to voters calling for merit selection, but the measure was overwhelmingly defeated-losing in every county in the state. 129 If anything, while stasis is the norm, election proponents have had more success than election opponents in generating traction. For example, in Kansas, individual counties that had merit selection have succeeded in abandoning appointments and returning to partisan elections. 130 In 2004, in the very state of the eponymous "Missouri Plan," fifty-seven Republicans proposed a constitutional amendment to replace merit selection with judicial elections. 131 All of which is to say, judicial elections are not going away, and may actually be on the rise again.
D. Critique of the Judicial Elections Critics
In the words of Lee Epstein, "the assaulters are under assault. Legitimacy (2012) , https://www.princeton.edu/csdp/events/Gibson10112012/Gibson10112012.pdf ("Most earlier research (and speculation) on the damaging consequences of judicial campaigns for legitimacy fails to recognize the inherent boost provided to courts by elections.").
scientists focused on attempting to discredit the underlying assumptions relied upon by judicial election naysayers. 135 Most notable in this line of debate are studies compiled by James Gibson and Melinda Gann Hall. 136 Gibson styles his study as responsive to those who decry the "impact of campaign activity on the perceived impartiality and hence legitimacy of elected state courts." 137 Asserting that critiques of judicial elections have little foundation in empirical data, 138 Gibson contends that the studies critical of judicial elections are "too fragmentary," and based on "too little rigorous research on campaign effects to draw credible conclusions." 139 Accordingly, Gibson advances what he describes as his "Expectancy Theory." 140 This theory is premised on the assertion that "citizens most likely hold views of what constitutes appropriate campaign activity." 141 He contends that in the aftermath of decisions such as Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, which afforded judges "greater leeway" in their campaign activities, the public's perception of judicial campaigns is changing. 142 Due to these changing perceptions, he believes "it is crucial to map the expectations people hold and to determine whether those expectations are connected to the willingness to extend legitimacy to judicial institutions." 143 At least through the lens of his own self-assessment, Gibson contends that he more properly values the net positive and negative effects of elections on court legitimacy, while elections critics merely consider "whether a particular ad campaign is churlish or even reprehensible." 144 Drawing on his study of 2006 supreme court contests in Kentucky, Gibson contends that the electorate expects a "politicized judiciary and . . . is not off-put by politicized campaigns"; rather, elections provide a "significant boost to the legitimacy of courts. This layered debate also addresses the issue of campaign spending. The assertions attacked are ones commonly used by judicial elections critics-too much money is spent in elections, money buys unequal influence and gives some individuals a greater voice than others, or campaigns with exorbitant price tags undermine judicial independence. 146 Like Gibson, Chris Bonneau, disputes the deleterious effects of campaign spending and contends that spending enhances electoral competition and electoral accountability. 147 Bonneau believes the more electoral competition; "the more congruent the behavior of an elected official will be with the electorate." 148 Though Bonneau looked specifically at the effect of campaign spending on incumbent performance, and Hall took a broader approach to examine the general conditions that affect voters, both come to a similar conclusion: campaign spending is not an ill, but rather "expensive campaigns can strengthen the critical linkage between citizens and the bench and enhance the quality of democracy." 149 Bonneau contends that his findings show the "antielection reformers [that] the outcomes of these elections are neither random nor unpredictable" but rather the electorate's choice between incumbent and challenger or even between two challengers can turn to a notable degree on the amount spent on their campaign. 150 Thus, campaign 223. Though Gibson admitted, "with every non-experimental study of change comes the possibility that a multitude of factors account for the change," he was very doubtful that increased attention on the election would increase the court's support. Id. at 224. Another critique of his study was that the Kentucky elections, the very elections which he studied, were not in fact very "churlish." Id. To this, Gibson answered by saying his study relied on the views of the respondents and what they considered to be churlish. He stated that while his critics are right by pointing out that the respondents did not believe the election to be "extraordinarily churlish," the evaluations were varied and respondents were found at both ends of the scale. Id. In all, Gibson admits that his study aiming to measure the legitimacy of courts in the eyes of constituents is less than perfect and believes its shortcomings should not be simply pointed out, but should serve as a catalyst to "develop more valid and reliable measures of institutional attitudes. spending assists the electorate in making a more steadfast decision. 151 Hall supports this view and asserts that those on the opposite side of the election debate cannot deny that campaign spending and vigorous competition are key components in understanding voter participation because they reduce information costs for voters and increase likelihood of voting. 152 She finds that regardless of whether one looks at the overall spending in an election or spending per capita, "money means voters in the supreme court elections." 153
IV. APPOINTMENTS
A. The Counter-Majoritarian Argument as the Touchstone Favoring Appointments
The most fundamental of all arguments favoring an appointive system for judges is the counter-majoritarian role of the courts. 154 The gravamen of the theory is that a judiciary independent of majoritarian pressures is emboldened to uphold rights and rule justly even in instances in which doing so means invalidating the popular will or majoritarian perspective. 155 The underlying predicate of the theory is that "contemporary constitutionalism entails a commitment to the protection of individual and group rights from political majorities." 156 Proponents of appointments also point to the counter-countermajoritarian role of elections, noting that "[t]he majoritarian difficulty asks not how unelected/unaccountable judges can be justified in a regime committed to democracy, but rather how elected/accountable judges can be justified in a regime committed to constitutionalism." 157 In tutionalism (which is committed to the rule of law and individual rights), and democracy (which is committed to rule by the majority). 158 Croley critiques the majoritarian perspective and supporters of judicial elections on two interconnected yet distinct grounds: the risk that an elected judiciary poses to the "unpopular minority" and the compromising impact that an elective system may have on the "impartial administration of 'day-to-day' justice." 159 Croley asserts that unscrupulous judges seeking reelection have an incentive to compromise the rights of subsets of their judicial electorate-namely the "unpopular, unorganized, or otherwise outvoted." 160 Compounding that systemic failure, scrupulous judges who refuse to bend to the will of the masses would be forced off the bench, further eroding the quality of justice. 161 While a discussion of the merits of the underlying controversy in the "Stanford Rape Case" is far beyond the scope of this article, a consideration of aspects pertaining to the judicial accountability-independence tension offers a new illustration of Croley's concerns. 162 Brock Turner, a student-athlete at Stanford, was convicted of three felony counts of sexual assault of an unconscious victim. 163 Turner was also sentenced to three years of probation and must file as a sex offender. In relation to the case, Judge Persky said, "A prison sentence would have a severe impact on him. I think he will not be a danger to others." Id.
Prosecutors sought six years for Turner, while the defense sought a four-month sentence. Probation officials suggested six months. Persky-citing Turner's age, the fact that he was drunk and thus bore 'less moral culpability,' and the lack of 'significant' prior legal problems-issued a six-month sentence, which includes three years of probation. John Bacon, Judge Under Fire in Stanford Rape Case Gets New Term, USA TODAY (June 7, 2016), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2016/06/07/judge-stanford-sex-assault-casedraws-outrage/85543204/. sentence, recall efforts against the judge were announced after organizers created an online petition, which garnered over 240,000 supporters in a matter of days. 165 The public backlash substantially affected Judge Persky's ability to perform on the bench. In August, Judge Persky recused himself in a child pornography case, 166 and requested to no longer preside over criminal cases. 167 Although efforts to recall Judge Persky from the bench ultimately failed, and despite the California Commission on Judicial Performance clearing him of any wrongdoing, Judge Persky, whose term expires in 2022, has bleak prospects of retaining his seat. 168 Croley's second primary concern with the majoritarian perspective pertains to the administration of day-to-day justice, and how electoral sway may compromise that duty. 169 Croley contends that judicial elections may cause judges to develop a manic sense of hyper awareness that can be dangerous and disruptive to the fair administration of justice. For example, Croley stated:
[A] judge [who is] given discretion by law to sentence convicted criminals by considering such factors as the number and type of past convictions, the severity of the way the particular offense was committed, the character of the convicted, and so on, may exercise that discretion not with reference to those factors alone, but instead to demonstrate her tough posture toward crime and thus to win favor from the majority whose continued favor is a necessary condition for reelection. 170 , http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-judgeaaron-persky-no-judicial-misconduct-20161219-story.html; Bacon, supra note 164 (Judge Persky avoided facing voters because he drew no challengers for his position, however the race took place immediately after the decision, at a point when public outrage and media coverage were at their inception).
See Remove Judge Aaron Persky from the Bench for Decision in Brock Turner
169. See Croley, supra note 155, at 728. 170. Id.
In sentencing Turner, Judge Persky used his discretion to consider factors such as moral culpability, the defendant's state of mind during the assault, previous criminal convictions, the impact of handing down a lengthy sentence, and the defendant's account of the events. 171 From a legal and judicial conduct perspective, as well as from a judicial independence perspective, the proper question is not whether Persky's determinations in his multi-factor analysis were correct in this particular case, but rather, whether making those valuation determinations was proper ex ante. With the question thus framed, Persky was cleared by an independent commission, which explained, simply: "[T]he commission has concluded that there is not clear and convincing evidence of bias, abuse of authority, or other basis to conclude that Judge Persky engaged in judicial misconduct warranting discipline." 172 However, a lack of discipline and a lack of impact are not synonymous:
Even though the panel won't discipline Judge Persky, his career has still been upended by the decision and the ensuing backlash.
Would-be jurors in other trials have refused to work with him, prosecutors had him removed from another sexual assault case, and an online petition calling for his impeachment had reached 1.3 million signatures as of [January 6, 2016]. 173
B. Critiques of Elections in Support of Appointments
The harmful effects of judicial elections are nowhere more evident than in the criminal justice context. It is here where the majoritarian will and corruptive forces meet to trample on individual rights. Judges find themselves most vulnerable when they are characterized as soft on crime "[g]iven the political unpopularity of criminal defendants as a group and the unique salience of crime in the public perception of judicial behavior." 174 Citizens United opened the floodgates for spending in state court races, thus allowing special interest groups to spend exorbitant amounts of money for ads, which are "by far the biggest driver of campaign costs." 176 Concerns over the content and impact of attack ads against judges and candidates are compounded by the increasingly concentrated, often opaque sources of the funding that pays for those ads. Empirical evidence shows that these ads are becoming increasingly controlling in judicial decision-making and are contributing to the rise in hostility of judges towards criminal defendants. 177 This hostility stems from the fact that most of these ads target a judge's criminal decisions 178 and vilify judges for casting votes in favor of criminal defendants, thus depicting them as "soft on crime." 179 Alternatively, threats of future attacks can bias sitting judges into voting against criminal defendants in an effort to preempt future ads. 180 This is, of course, problematic because judges are charged with a countermajoritarian function. Thus, they are expected not to react the same way to the majoritarian will or reelection prospects that other elected officials do. 181 Empirical evidence now shows that "as the volume of campaigning in a state's supreme court elections [increased], judicial decisions appeared to be less sympathetic to criminal defendants by a statistically significant margin even controlling for ideology, party, and other predictors of judicial decision-making." 182 This is because the only on elections were struck down by Citizens United were less likely to vote in favor of criminal defendants than they were before the decision.").
176 way a judge can insulate herself from the threat of being perceived as "soft on crime" is by being more punitive towards criminal defendants, especially as election day draws nearer. 183
V. INCREMENTALISM
While the Platonic Form of judicial selection is an interesting, ethereal abstraction, the reality is that there is no "perfect" or even "good" method of judicial selection. 184 Any judgment with respect to the Forms is necessarily sourced in myriad, subjective, debatable valuations of the Forms' component parts. Further, it is impossible to engage in a comparative analysis divorced of normative perspectives. Although a focus on incremental reforms to improve both elective and appointive systems may be incorrectly perceived as less ambitious, a focus on improving extant judicial selection systems is far more realistic than calls for eliminating or transitioning from a particular system altogether. 185 Incremental measures have seen varying degrees of success 186 and are more likely to gain traction, whereas efforts to transition from one system to another, or even conjure entirely new systems, have been largely unsuccessful. As Roy Schotland aptly expressed, "given the prevalence of judicial elections, and the high likelihood that they will stay with us, incrementalism is the only feasible or-at the very least-the most likely way to protect the hard-to-secure balance between judicial independence and judicial accountability." 187 No matter how a state selects its judges, threats to judicial independence and accountability, as well as diminished public trust, are prevalent. 188 Elective systems must be improved. Appointive systems must be improved.
Whether rich or poor, educated or uneducated, or defined by any number of other characteristics, the litigants in the courtroom appear not before a system of judicial selection, but rather, a judge. It is in such mundane, pedestrian, and utterly generic moments that grand concepts like due process are most critically tested. Devoting more resources to the Forms debate does nothing to improve the administration, perception, and caliber of justice in that mundane moment. Moreover, given zero sum dynamics, it is almost indisputable-though almost never acknowledged-that the resources devoted to the Forms debate, come at the expense of measures that could marginally improve process, justice, and the perceptions of the same. Endeavors focused instead on incremental measures make "bad systems" better, and while such endeavors are not guaranteed to succeed even if adopted, the system should benefit from an increased devotion of political, academic, and advocacy energies. 189 
A. Strengthening Recusal Procedures
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co. 190 is demonstrative of two concerns that plague judicial elections: the influence of money 191 and flawed recusal procedures. However, Caperton's greatest impact will come in the form of "spurring greater vigilance in recusal, both systematically and among individual jurists." 192 In Caperton, a $50 million jury verdict was entered against Massey Coal. 193 Massey Coal's CEO, Don Blankenship, while appealing the verdict, chose to support the candidacy of Brent Benjamin to the very same court that would hear the appeal. 194 Blankenship spent over $3 million in support of Benjamin's campaign, which amounted to more money than was spent by all of Benjamin's other supporters combined. 195 Benjamin defeated the incumbent and was elected to the court that would hear Blankenship's appeal. Benjamin refused to recuse, 196 and ultimately cast the deciding vote to overturn the verdict against Blankenship in a 3-2 decision. 197 Caperton appealed the decision to the United States Supreme Court, arguing Benjamin's failure to recuse violated due process. 198 Caperton is demonstrative of the intersection of monetary influence and notions of due process. Although in elections, where big spenders are often favored to "win" before the courts, the distinction between spenders-whether big or small-and non-spenders, should be eliminated. It is at the heart of due process to ensure a fair tribunal is afforded to all litigants, not just the ones with deep pockets. But when states inadequately address these concerns, recusal may be the only remedy available to ensure due process. See James Sample, De- In the words of the Court, "[i]t is axiomatic that a 'fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.'" 200 This basic requirement was jeopardized by the "serious risk of actual bias-based on objective and reasonable perception." 201 The Court found this "serious risk" existed "when a person with a personal stake in a particular case had a significant and disproportionate influence in placing the judge on the case by raising funds or directing the judge's election campaign when the case was pending or imminent." 202 In the context of an elected judiciary, there is more than one constitutional interest stake: and maintaining a balance between due process and First Amendment interests is critically important. 203 When that balance is skewed, the perception that justice is for sale severely undermines faith in the rule of law. 204 In state courts, where 100 million cases are brought before 30,000 judges each year, 205 most judges whose impartiality is being questioned "[are] the initial, and in some cases the sole or final, arbiter[s] of whether [they are] sufficiently impartial to continue presiding over the case." 206 A chief problem that arises from self-disqualification stems from what Melinda Marbes describes as the "bias blind spot." 207 Taking more of a psychological approach to examining recusal procedures, Marbes concluded that the bias blind spot often causes judges to be unaware of how their own objectivity concerning their impartiality is impaired. 208 With that being said, it could be argued Justice Benjamin suffered from the bias blind spot when he determined the contributions he was given by Blankenship in support of his successful campaign to the bench did not render him partial to deciding in Blankenship's favor in Caperton. However, when recusal practice is unsuccessful, as was the case in Caperton, litigants are often left with little redress. They suffer from not only the cuts they sustain by the opposing party, but from the exacerbation of these wounds by the judge who unequivocally refuses to acknowledge his or her own impartiality. 209 That is why instead of performing reconstructive surgery on judicial selection systems, which would require an overhaul, the focus should be on placing a tourniquet on the rule of law as it stands, which culminates with strengthening recusal procedures.
Writing for the majority in Caperton, Justice Kennedy left the door for strengthening recusal standards open when he pronounced that "[s]tates may choose to 'adopt recusal standards more rigorous than due process requires.'" 210 The due process clause sets the floor for judicial disqualification and states may build upon this floor through codes of judicial conduct, which have the ability to provide more protection than due process requires. 211 Rather than focusing on reforming recusal laws on a substantive basis, this Article recommends amending such laws on a procedural basis. 212 The following list represents a series of suggested procedural reforms for recusals:
• Independent adjudications of recusal motions. . Even before Caperton was decided, Frost advocated against substantive reformation by stating "the lesson learned from the troubled history of judicial disqualification is that better procedures, rather than stricter substantive standards, are needed to govern the law's application." Id. at 552. She argues that "[i]t is time to stop tinkering with the substantive standard for recusal, and instead to propose reforming the process by which the recusal decision is made." Id. at 535. Similarly, Charles Geyh rails against modifying substantive disqualification rules as well. Recusal%20Paper_FINAL.pdf. One particular method of procedural reformation for disqualification worth discussing, which Professor Geyh advocates for as well, was similarly articulated by Amanda Frost. See Geyh, supra note 207, at 719. Frost proposes a "process-oriented approach to judicial recusal" that would subject a jurist, whose impartiality is being questioned, to a process that is similar to that of an archetypal adversarial process. Id. (quoting Frost, supra note 212, at 531). The solution she offers is "to incorporate into recusal law the core tenets of adjudication," which would entail parties presenting facts and arguments to an impartial judge, and then having that impartial judge issue a reasoned explanation for their ruling. Frost, supra note 212, at 535.
214. SAMPLE ET AL., supra note 213, at 26. As Schotland notes, there are states that have "fine, even exemplary" peremptory-strike challenge procedures for trial-court judges. Schotland, supra note 13, at 520. Currently, there are nineteen states that allow for the peremptory disqualification of one judge per proceeding. SAMPLE ET AL., supra note 213, at 26. Peremptory disqualification essentially grants litigants a "free pass" to secure an impartial judge without having to endure the consequences that stem from disqualification motions, in the event that such a motion were to fail. Id.
215. SAMPLE ET AL., supra note 213, at 32-33. 216. See id. at 33; see also Marbes, supra note 206, at 810 (calling for "(1) either eliminating the challenged jurist from the decision-making process or, at a minimum, providing for prompt de novo review of the challenged jurist's determination; (2) requiring meaningful disclosure by both the jurist and the parties; and (3) mandating that any order denying disqualification be in writing, include reasons, and be published").
217. Schotland, supra note 13, at 520. Under the Rooney Rule, when NFL teams are searching for candidates for head coaching job vacancies, said teams are required to interview at least one candidate from a minority background. Id. at 520-21; see Mike Sando, Rooney Rule In Reverse: Minority Coaching Hires Have Stalled, ESPN (Jul. 19, 2016), http://www.espn.com/nfl/ story/_/id/17101097/staggering-numbers-show-nfl-minority-coaching-failure-rooney-rule-tonydungy. What the rule requires "is a conversation -a chance to talk and to listen." Schotland, supra note 13, at 521. Applying the Rooney Rule in a judicial context, if courts leave disqualification decisions in the hands of the judge whose impartiality is being questioned, before that very same judge rules on the motion, that judge shall have a conversation, to be kept confidential, "with a panel of three court-appointed 'wise souls' (probably retired judges, lawyers, and legal academics with rotating terms of, say, two years)." Id. However, such a consultation may prove to be unnecessary if the judge grants the recusal motion outright. Id.
218. Sandra Day O'Connor, Foreword to SAMPLE ET AL., supra note 213, at 3, 9.
The independence of the judiciary is progressively being threatened as a result of the bench becoming "increasingly politicized, polarized, and dominated by special interests." 219 The Brennan Center has reported that special interest spending reached "new heights" in the 2016 election cycle, with outside groups spending nearly $20 million on television ads. 220 A significant percentage of this spending was done by groups who do not disclose the identities of their donors. This dark money is directly attributable to the fallout caused by Citizens United, which permitted unlimited spending by corporations and unions. 221 This increased spending, especially in judicial races, is incredibly troubling because judges hear cases involving campaign contributors. What is even more troubling is that conflicts of interest cannot even be identified, which "poses a major threat to the integrity of our justice system." 222 With the election of Donald Trump, it is likely the Supreme Court will regain its conservative majority. In light of Trump's nomination of Neil Gorsuch, 223 it is highly unlikely the Court will overturn Citizens United-" [t] here is nothing in Judge Gorsuch's record to suggest that he is hostile to recent Supreme Court money in politics decisions. If anything, there is some evidence that he thinks the Court could go further in rolling back campaign finance restrictions." 224 Instead of advocating for the Court to reverse Citizens United or even encouraging states to eliminate judicial elections, an emphasis should be placed on emboldening states to adopt public financing systems for their judicial races. Currently, only two states have public financing systems in place for judicial elections to their appellate courts. 225 Public financing can be used to combat corruption, improve the public's confidence and faith in our government, increase voter 
Small-Donor Matching Funds
Amplifying the role of small donors, through small donor matchingfunds systems, has the ability to lessen a candidate's reliance on contributions from interest groups or wealthy individuals. 235 This is because most of a candidate's private donations would likely be received from average Americans and those donations would be amplified through matching public funds. This type of a system "provides publicly financed candidates the flexibility they need given the unpredictable cost of judicial campaigns. Because these funds are not disbursed in reaction to an opponent's expenditures, they cannot be construed as a 'penalty' for speech like the matching funds at issue in [Arizona Free Enterprise] ." 236 New York City's small-donor matching system is not only been the longest lasting small-donor system in the nation, but has been championed as one of the most successful systems as well. 237 New York City's system empowers small donors by matching the first $175 of a campaign donation, on a six-to-one basis. 238 For example, if Donor A gives $100 to Candidate B, A's $100 donation will be worth $700 to B. The effects of the system have been wide-ranging, and the system is proving to be successful in multiple regards. Recently, almost 90% of candidates in New York City opted in to participate in the program. 239 The system is appropriating enough funds to candidates to attract participation. Further, the system enhances diversity in the political process 240 (1) collect a minimum number of contributions worth $10 or more from the area they seek to represent, and raise a minimum amount of contributions that could be matched, which are contributions worth at a maximum $175; (2) comply with the full provisions set forth in New York City's Campaign Finance Act; and (3) have an opponent on the ballot. How It Works, N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FINANCE BOARD, http://www.nyccfb.info/program/ how-it-works (last visited Feb. 5, 2017). Once a candidate qualifies, they must agree to spending limits and return leftover public funds to the city after the election ends. Id. Further, the amount of public funds a candidate is able to receive under this system is equivalent to 55% of a candidate's spending limit-this cap is meant to encourage candidates to use both private and public funds to finance their campaigns. constituents rather than focusing all their attention on out-of-district donors." 241 [New York City's public financing] system has allowed candidates "to fuse their fundraising efforts with voter outreach, and has incentivized political engagement by communities that can only afford modest contributions-communities all too often ignored by traditionally funded candidates." The system has given rise to "house parties"-small political gatherings where ordinary citizens can learn about candidates and make small contributions. 242 This system could prove to be a model for other states seeking to decrease the role of outside interest groups in their judicial elections and amplify the role of small donors. 243
Vouchers
If states disfavor small-donor matching systems, voucher systems provide another alternative. Not everyone that may want to contribute to a campaign of their choice may have the money to do so, but voucher programs have the ability to "level-up" the participation of voters who are "shut out" of the system and "level-down" the individuals who have "disproportionate . . . capital to exercise greater influence over the political system." 244 If the baseline is the status quo, are small-donor matching systems truly bringing about a sense of neutrality? 245 [V] oucher plans level-up in the sense that all voters, even those voters who have never made campaign contributions before, are given vouchers to contribute to candidates for federal office. Vouchers facilitate the representation of groups that lack a voice in the current system. But these vouchers also level-down by prohibiting all other sources of campaign money; the rich can no longer exercise greater influence through private contributions and independent expenditures."). Id. at 21.
245. After all, the inequitable distribution of wealth is a natural occurrence in our society. Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 884 (1987) . Although "Buckley, like Lochner, grew out of an understanding that for constitutional purposes, the existing distribution of wealth must be taken as simply 'there,' and that efforts to change that distribution are impermissible." Id. However, vouchers are distinguishable from the regulations that were at issue in Buckley. Vouchers could promote political equality without "threatening to diminish aggregate levels of political discussion." Cass R. Sunstein, Political Equality and Unintended Consequences, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1390 REV. , 1413 REV. (1994 . This is because voters, and candidates alike, are "quite free to take and give as they choose. " Id. worth $100 for each bi-annual federal election. 246 He would allow the vouchers to be donated directly to candidates, licensed interest groups, and political parties. 247 If a candidate opted in to his voucher system, that candidate would have to agree to not receive any other donations-including dinners paid for by lobbyists and all-expensespaid retreats in Maui. 248 Further, the candidate would not be allowed to use private funds. 249 Although Hasen's proposal was geared towards federal elections, it could be adopted at the state and local levels as well.
Recently, Seattle implemented a voucher program that is quite similar to the Hasen model. 250 In 2017, Seattle voters will each receive four $25 vouchers to distribute to candidates that are running for City Council seats and the City Attorney's Office. 251 This system is the "first in the country" and the vouchers will even be provided to people who are not voters as long as they are 18 years old, a U.S. Citizen (or U.S. national or green-card holder), and live in Seattle. 252 Although Seattle's system does not provide public funds for judicial races, it is nonetheless a system to keep an eye on in upcoming elections. If successful, Seattle's voucher system could provide the groundwork to be implemented in other jurisdictions, as well as for other types of races, including those for judgeships.
C. Lengthening Terms
Among the best-known quotations of judicial politics is that deciding a controversial case while facing reelection is akin to "finding a crocodile in your bathtub when you go in to shave in the morning. You know it's there, and you try not to think about it, but it's hard to 246 . Hasen, supra note 244, at 21. 247. Id. at 22. Although interest groups are dominating in our political world, the purpose of allowing a voter to contribute to licensed interest groups would be to have the group reflect more of the voter's voice and its followers, as opposed to its wealth or ability to organize. Id. at 27. The interest groups Professor Hasen discusses could be created by any voter, and the license to create the group would be free. In order for a candidate to be eligible to receive money from the vouchers, they need to "drum up a baseline number of campaign contributions, agree to take part in multiple public debates, adhere to lower campaign contribution limits and agree to special campaign spending camps. " Id. think about much else while you're shaving." 253 Especially when facing reelection, a sitting judge "may understandably, [and] perhaps inescapably, be concerned about being on the wrong side of a hotbutton matter." 254 "The mere potential of lightning-rod distortions jeopardizes judicial independence and open-mindedness." 255 According to evidentiary findings, the judicial independence of judges who face reelection is potentially compromised, especially in the criminal context. 256 The closer judges are to facing reelection, the more likely they are to issue harsher criminal sentences, including death sentences; 257 the "[p]roximity to re-election makes judges more punitive." 258 Lengthening terms can address issues commonly associated with judges whom are seeking reelection. 259 Only one state in the country provides its judges (at any level) life tenure-Rhode Island. 260 This Article does not suggest that every state should adopt the Rhode Island or federal approach regarding term lengths, but terms of ten years or longer are preferable. Schot-land describes three motives for lengthening terms: (1) as mentioned above, the "crocodile in [the] bathtub," or in other words, protecting judicial independence-longer terms give judges "far more ability to decide cases as they see them"; (2) longer terms would incentivize more and better candidates to seek judgeships; and (3) longer terms mean judges will be subjected to reelection on a less frequent basis, thus they will not need to campaign as much. 261 Decreasing the frequency of judicial reelection through increased term limits is appealing, especially from a campaigning perspective. If we are honest, Chief Justice Roberts' claim in Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar 262 that "[j]udges are not politicians, even when they come to the bench by way of the ballot" 263 is, at best, an articulation of an ideal that no longer exists, and probably never did. Judges are different than other politicians, but they are nonetheless politicians especially when they are accountable to an electoral constituency.
D. Diversifying the Bench
A problem permeating both elective and appointive systems is the lack of diversity among the individuals who are selected to the bench. 264 Evidence is contradictory as to which method of selection produces a more diverse bench. Indeed, some studies have found that there is no clear connection between how a judge is selected and the diversity of the members of the bench. 265 Irrespective of how a judge is selected, this lack of diversity diminishes "public confidence in the courts and creates a jurisprudence uninformed by a broad range of experiences." 266 Judges that do not accurately reflect the communities they serve will cause the public to doubt the judicial system. 267 In both types of selection systems, factors that lead to this misrepresentation are money, old-boys networks, and biases. 268 Spiraling fundraising demands are in tension with the goal of increasing diversity on the bench. The threshold campaign war chest 261 
E. Voter Guides
Judicial candidate voter guides could better inform the electorate about the candidates that appear on their ballots. The National Center for State Courts has reported that fifteen states do not publish an official voter guide for some, if not all, of the judicial candidates who are seeking election to the bench. 276 Typical components of a voter guide include the candidate's education, professional background, community involvement, and a personal statement as to why that candidate is running for a seat on the bench. 277 Guides should also include information about the "unique role of judges and how that role affects, or should affect, the way that elections are conducted." 278 Although the cost of producing and mailing voter guides is an oft-cited reason as to why they are not used, states, or other groups, should be encouraged to publish guides on their websites instead. 279 If low voter turnout is a consequence of an electorate deciding not to vote because they are uninformed, 280 voter guides could provide the electorate the information they need to not only be cognizant of the candidates, but also "offset and correct erroneous information that might surface in an opponent's false advertisement." 281
